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Abstract In the bargaining experiment, the privately
informed seller of a company sends a value message to
the uninformed potential buyer who proposes a price
for acquiring the company. Participants are constantly
either seller or buyer and interact over 30 rounds with
randomly changing partners. How are overstating the
value of the company, underpricing the received value
message and acceptance of price offers affected by
experience and gender (constellation)? We control via
treatments for awareness of gender (constellation) and
show that gender (constellation) matters and that the
main experience effects apply across gender
(constellations).
Keywords Bargaining  Price signals  Learning 
Experiment  Gender  Winner’s curse  Take-over
bidding
JEL Classifications C78  C91  D83  J16
1 Introduction
Gender effects in small business economics are a
familiar topic since the analyses of Daly (1991), Brush
(1992), Rosa et al. (1996) but varied in which aspect is
considered: mainly self-employment as well as own-
ership, management and performance. In 1991,
Loscocco et al. explain the lower female success by
lack of experience and their stronger presence in less
profitable industry sectors by structural disadvantages.
More recently, the relevance of gender differences in
small business economics has been debated in many
situations such as competitiveness (Bo¨nte and Piegeler
2013), business creation rate (Minniti and Nardone
2007), size and composition of start-up capital and its
use (Verheul and Thurik 2001). The results are not
univocal but mainly give rise to the question if gap of
experience can explain gender differences.
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Our results confirm some of those field findings but
mainly differ in the behavior we study as well as in the
empirical method.
What we analyze is framed as acquiring or selling a
company and thus renders ownership the crucial
endogenous aspect. Rather than comparing manage-
ment performances across gender, our focus is on
bargaining behavior in situations with incomplete
information (only sellers know the values of their
firms) and common evaluation (sellers’ and buyers’
evaluations are perfectly correlated) and behavior in
both roles (potential buyer and potential seller).
Regarding the empirical method, we clearly differ
by relying on experimental rather than survey data
(like Arentz et al. 2013, who test of the role of prior
knowledge in entrepreneurial discovery). However,
our results, i.e., that experience more than gender
matters, are in line with both some of the earlier and
the more recent economic contributions.
In our stylized experimental setup, acquisition
decisions are analyzed in the form of take-over
bidding, i.e., as ‘‘take-it-or-leave-it’’ offer bargaining,
where unlike to most other such bargaining experi-
ments (see Gu¨th and Kocher 2014, for a recent review)
we allow for a privately better informed seller. We
investigate the differences between inexperienced and
experienced participants analyzing cheap talk value
signals, experience and gender in a bargaining exper-
iment: the privately informed seller of a company
sends a value message to the uninformed potential
buyer who then proposes a price (a take-over bid) for
acquiring the company.1 To do so, the Acquiring-a-
Company game (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) is
modified by an initial (cheap talk) value message from
the privately informed seller to the buyer, before the
take-it-or-leave-it price offer to the seller.
Cheap talk is usually experimentally implemented
via more or less restricted pre-play communication
and has been shown to improve coordination (see for
an early survey Crawford 1998), e.g., in game
experiments with multiple equilibria, and to crowd
out costly punishing, e.g., in ultimatum game exper-
iments, where it represents a less costly alternative for
expressing own anger or disappointment. Cheap talk
may reduce or even resolve the problem of asymmetric
information which can lead to no-trade results as in
markets for lemons (Akerlof 1970) and in the
Acquiring-a-Company game (Samuelson and Bazer-
man 1985). Compared to such communication, value
messages which can be false or true are also ‘‘cheap’’
but hardly qualify as ‘‘talk.’’ To the best of our
knowledge, little research has been directed toward the
role of such ‘‘value stating’’ cheap talk in bargaining
experiments with private information and control of
experience and gender (constellation).2
Although several studies investigate gender differ-
ences in preferences and behavior,3 very few jointly
focus on experience and gender (constellation). Casari
et al. (2007), who study the winner’s curse in common
value auctions4 to understand how experienced bid-
ders learn to avoid it, find that women are much more
susceptible to the winner’s curse as inexperienced
bidders than men with this difference disappearing for
experienced bidders. Their estimates also show that
women learn much faster than men: they start out
bidding much worse only to close much of the gap in
the final periods; this is also confirmed by Ham and
Kagel (2006) and Ortmann and Tichy (1999) for a
prisoner’s dilemma-type game who find women
cooperating significantly more than men in early
rounds with this difference disappearing in the later
rounds. Regarding the effects on gender constellation
for which we also control we refer to Sutter et al.
(2009) who especially alert to equal gender
constellations.
1 As already mentioned, our analysis neglects antitrust regula-
tion to prevent acquisitions which would question market
competition and thereby harm customers (see for such regula-
tion Posner 2009).
2 Considering such true or false reporting and gender, Dreber
and Johannesson (2008), as well as Erat and Gneezy (2011) and
Gneezy (2005), find that men are more likely to lie for a
monetary gain than women and Houser et al. (2012) observe
that men are more likely to incorrectly report the result of a
private coin flip than women (unlike in bargaining such false
reporting does not harm another participant but the experi-
menter), yet they do not investigate whether those gender
differences in cheap talk persist when controlling for
experience.
3 Croson and Gneezy (2009) provide an extensive overview of
gender differences documented in studies on risk attitude, social
preferences (ultimatum and dictator games, trust and reciproc-
ity, prisoner’s dilemmas, social dilemmas and public good
provision) and competitive behavior.
4 Without considering cheap talk value messages for which we
allow in our experiment, but which are rarely studied in auction
experiments (see Kagel and Levin 2014).
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Without discussing the usual (dis)advantages of
experiments in empirical research like their question-
able internal and external validity but better control of
institutional aspects like market rules, information and
(material) incentives we readily acknowledge that
experience will probably matter a lot but that control
of gender (constellation) and, for the ease of compar-
ison, of ‘‘field of study’’ (constellation) seems a bit
awkward. Nevertheless, in a hierarchically organized
enterprise or owner-run small business, the gender of
the one being finally responsible for (merger and)
acquisition may be decisive. In such case, commonly
known gender (constellation) is admittedly special but
not very unrealistic. Note also that, although we
explore experience effects, we try to preserve the one-
off aspect of acquisition bargaining by (random)
strangers matching and by paying only one random
round (see Sect. 3 for more details on the experimental
protocols).
Our conjectures about behavior (acceptance of
price offer, prices offered and value messages) are
shaped by the initial one-round findings, reported in
our companion paper (Di Cagno et al. 2016) what
explains that we do not state and test (so far
unexplored) hypotheses. Nevertheless it is, in our
view, crucially important to assess how effects for
inexperienced participants survive when becoming
much more familiar with the setup and when gaining
more and more experience when assuming that
random rematching and asymmetric information jus-
tify our one-off interaction benchmark analysis.
In our setting, as in a signaling game, the
uninformed buyer might infer some information from
the value message about the true value of the firm
owned by the seller. However, sellers of low value
firms should also send high value messages: in the
suggestive terminology of Erat and Gneezy (2011) this
suggests ‘‘selfish black lies’’ to which we will refer in
our context as ‘‘making-up’’ (the value of the firm).5
Therefore, only pooling equilibria emerge with the
same uninformative (high) value messages sent by
sellers.
This game-theoretic rigor, used to establish only
pooling equilibria or, in other words, to disqualifying
the value message as ‘‘cheap talk,’’ is due to the strict
rules of social exchange: the one sided value message
of the seller to the buyer is one social exchange before
the buyer states the take-it-or-leave-it price offer. This
differs from the study of Valley et al. (1998) who also
allow for social exchange in the context of Acquiring-
a-Company, only in different face communication
formats (face-to-face bargaining, written negotiation
exchange, telephone negotiations). This obviously
excludes strict game-theoretic reasoning but, as
expected, is quite efficiency enhancing with the
strongest effect, with respect to fair surplus sharing,
for face-to-face negotiations. Here we wanted to
maintain the strict strategic format by implementing
the Modified Acquiring-a-Company6 setup as a
Bayesian game as much as possible, thus allowing
for many repetitions-which would be difficult for the
Valley et al. (1998) setup- and restricting identifiabil-
ity of one’s interaction partner to either gender or field
of study, or both. As such we feel that we are, to the
best of our knowledge, pioneering in jointly analyzing
the three dimensions involved in our study, namely
cheap talk, gender (constellation) and experience.
According to our companion study Di Cagno et al.
(2016), based on a single incentivized play of this
game, it is found that value messages positively and
significantly increase price offers. Will experience
strengthen or weaken this effect? We expected the
latter, i.e., convergence to pooling. Although one
interacts with randomly changing trading partners in
the other role, repetitive play may trigger reputation
concerns, e.g., in the form of role (a participant is
constantly either a potential seller or buyer) or of
gender solidarity. Of course, such reputation effects
are unlikely in stochastic games, especially those with
private information. On the other hand, trade is always
efficiency enhancing and at least some seller partic-
ipants might be intrinsically motivated to signal the
true value.
For the same experimental setting, we have
collected data from participants interacting over 30
rounds (with fixed role of either seller or buyer and
randomly changing partners in the other role) to test
how overstating the value of the company, underpric-
ing the received value message and acceptance of
price offers are affected by experience and gender
(constellation). By comparing three successive phases
5 According to our data ‘‘selfish black lies,’’ however, coexist
with significant and persistent understating and truth-telling.
6 Valley et al. (2002) compare such free format replay
communication and a no communication control treatment for
situations with two-sided incomplete information.
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consisting of 10 rounds each, labeled early phase
(rounds 1–10), intermediate phase (rounds 11–20) and
late phase (rounds 21–30), we will analyze how
experience shapes acceptance of price offers, price
offers and value messages where our focus is on
experience effects but not on individual learning (for a
review of experiments on individual learning, see
Camerer 2003).
Quite surprisingly, a constant positive share of
seller participants invests in role reputation by not
overstating (their firm’s value) with a relevant hetero-
geneity in not ‘‘making-up’’ within and across the
three phases with 10 successive rounds each.7 Con-
cerns for role reputation thus exist but only for a
minority of experimental traders.
It seems to depend on intrinsic motivation and
social dynamics8 whether behavior converges to
pooling or whether some trust in value messages
pertains, possibly together with price offers aiming at
fair surplus sharing. Of course, one might appeal to
other regarding concerns (one may want to distinguish
oneself from other seller participants with excessively
large signals or compensate harm caused by other
price offers). However, in a context with private
information it seems far easier to achieve such effects
via truth-telling, i.e., by not lying.
Our results offer data:
1. for seller participants: mainly overstating (‘‘mak-
ing-up’’) but also truth-telling and understating
(the value of one’s firm) as well as (non)
acceptance of (non) profitable price offers,
2. for buyer participants: price offers which are
systematically lower than the value message
received (‘‘suspicion’’ or ‘‘equal surplus sharing’’
or weaker forms of letting both sides gain) and
based on more or less trust in value messages,
3. for gender (constellation): according to which
female acceptance is to a greater extent influenced
by experience than the male one, in suspicious-
ness gender constellation seems to interact with
path dependence for females (female buyers are
more suspicious when confronting male sellers)
and gender difference co-evolves with ‘‘making-
up’’ (female sellers are only significantly less
overstating than males in the early phase). An
obvious hypothesis claims gender (constellation)
effect to be considerably weakened or even
eliminated by game playing experience and
suggests that gender (constellation) effects mainly
rely on data of inexperienced decision making.
Since treatments partly allow for commonly
known gender constellations, this does not only
apply to conditioning behavior on own gender but
also on another’s gender.
‘‘Making-up’’ and ‘‘suspicion’’ persist, gender (con-
stellation) effects seem to be rather paradigmatic,
given the different tasks and skills of human males and
females in our evolutionary history (see also the
related discussion in our companion paper). In our
view, gender research has thus far neglected the
aspects on which we focus on.
Finally, it hardly needs to be justified that ‘‘making-
up’’ (consider not only commercial but also private
life, e.g., when searching a spouse) and ‘‘suspicion’’
(in commercial and private life we often doubt what
others can offer) are important. Altogether it seems
very interesting and informative to compare behavior
of inexperienced and experienced participants, who
both matter economically, e.g., when designing spot
markets whose traders change frequently, respec-
tively, when establishing institutions which are to be
encountered repeatedly.
The paper develops as follows: Sect. 2 introduces
the modified game. Section 3 describes the experi-
mental protocol. Descriptive statistics are discussed in
Sect. 4. Section 5 provides the regression analysis.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix 1 (Tables) and
Appendix 2 (English Translated Instructions) follow.
2 Game model
The buyer’s value v of the firm, owned by the seller, is
randomly generated according to the uniform density
concentrated on (0, 1). This is commonly known along
with the fact that for the seller the value of the firm is
only qv, with 0\q\1. If trade occurs at price p, the
buyer earns v p and the seller p qv. The decision
process in each round is as follows:
7 A significant share of participants frequently and persistently
signals the value consistent with truth-telling what, however,
does not suffice that buyer participants, who often and
repeatedly experience false signals, will trust in ‘‘Kantian
imperatives.’’
8 We refrain from postulating convergence of the interacting
dynamics after 30 rounds.
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(i) knowing v, the seller sends the value message
v^ ¼ v^ðvÞ which might be true (v^ ¼ v) or false
(v^ 6¼ v);
(ii) after receiving the message v^, the buyer
proposes the price p ¼ pðv^Þ;
(iii) after receiving the price offer, the seller accepts
it (dðpÞ ¼ 1) or rejects it (dðpÞ ¼ 0).
The seller earns dðpÞðp qvÞ and the buyer dðpÞ
ðv pÞ: when trading, i.e., when dðpÞ ¼ 1, the total
surplus vð1  qÞ is always positive. When not trading,
i.e., when dðpÞ ¼ 0, both buyer and seller earn nothing.
Since dðpÞ ¼ 1 is only optimal for p qv, a risk
neutral buyer expects to earn
Z p=q
0
v pð Þdv ¼ 0:5  qð Þ p
2
q2
ð1Þ
which increases (decreases) with p for
q\0:5ðq[ 0:5Þ. Since v\1 implies vq\q, it is
never optimal for the buyer to offer a price higher than
q: the price p ¼ q is optimal for q 0:5; whereas trade
is avoided by p ¼ 0 for q[ 0:5. This benchmark
solution is not questioned by cheap talk.
The Acquiring-a-Company game is a convenient
experimental workhorse designed to study the winner’s
curse, even when allowing for cheap talk. Indeed, buyer
participants may fail to anticipate that positive price offers
are accepted only if v p=q. This then might induce
them to offer prices p which yield -assuming dðpÞ ¼ 1
whenever p qv-less than predicted. Of course, the
benchmark solution denies the existence of a winner’s
curse. How is the benchmark solution, based on
buyer’s risk neutrality and backward induction, then
questioned when (i) the seller may be averse to
overstating, i.e., to send a value message v^ðvÞ[ v and
(ii) the buyer may or not be aware of the seller’s moral
concerns? The game-theoretic approach would inves-
tigate these modifications via a signaling game with
the better informed (about the firm’s value as well as
their own guilty feelings) seller moving first so that the
uninformed buyer can possibly infer the firm’s value
from the value signal v^: an interesting analytic
exercise but an extremely unrealistic one since the
seller’s idiosyncratic feelings of guilt will never be
common knowledge.9
Still one might want to speculate how behavior is
affected when—at least some—seller participants are
feeling obliged to tell the truth. When expecting this,
buyer participants may believe the message v^ and
suggest a price between qv^ and v^. Quite fairness-
minded buyer participants might even propose the
price pðv^Þ ¼ ð1þqÞv^
2
in order to share the surplus from
trade ð1  qÞv^ equally: actually quite a number of
seller participants feel obliged to choose v^ðvÞ ¼ v,
with many price offers lying between qv^ and v^.
However, cheap talk value messages more frequently
induce opportunistic sellers to try to exploit buyers by
‘‘making-up’’ via v^ðvÞ[ v and this, in turn, questions
buyers’ trust in the message sent by their seller. We
expected that because of learning most participants
will not trust the value messages which also discour-
age attempts to share the surplus (more or less)
equally. This denies cyclic adaptations, e.g., in the
sense of trustworthiness (v^ðvÞ close to v) and trusting
(pðv^Þ[ v^) first evolving, then eroding before again
recovering.
Before turning to the experimental design let us
comment on the recent debate on other regarding
concerns, often described as social preferences (see
Cooper and Kagel 2013, for a survey), and of ethical
restrictions in decision making, e.g., in the form of
(intrinsic) costs of lying (see, for instance Kartik
2009). To the best of our knowledge, the supporting
evidence for such concerns so far is nearly exclusively
restricted to one-off interactions, what renders any
attempt to model the dynamics of other regarding as
well as of ethical concerns as speculation without
facts. Of course, many efficiency minded participants
tried to implement trade, both when theoretically
predicted and when not, since it is efficiency enhanc-
ing. Similarly, as already mentioned, a significant
minority of sellers participants abstained from ‘‘mak-
ing-up.’’ But nearly all participants displayed inter-
personal heterogeneity by sometimes being morally
guided and sometimes not where this partly depends
on the choice task.10 In our view, we should first
establish stylized facts about moral dynamics in
stochastic interaction context before prematurely
trying to model it.
9 The common priors assumption in the tradition of Harsanyi
(1967–1968) is philosophically interesting, and possibly infor-
mative, but very unrealistic.
10 Seller participants, for instance, hardly ever accepted a minor
loss even when being aware that trade is very profitable for the
buyer.
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3 Experimental protocol
We refer here to the part (labeled Phase II in the
Instructions) of our broader experimental project that
allows us to analyze experience and gender effects.11
This stage consists of playing the same bargaining
game for 30 rounds and has been preceded by one
incentivized trial round which should allow our
participants to understand their decision tasks in the
following 30 rounds.12 In line with the one-off
interaction assumption of the analysis in Sect. 2, we
implemented random strangers matching. The rela-
tively large (mostly 16) number of participants in the
other role in a given session as well as the private
information seemed sufficient to discourage attempts
of individual reputation formation. We ran 12 sessions
with a total of 376 students (11 sessions with 32
participants each plus one session with 24) in the
laboratory of Max Planck Institute of Economics in
Jena, recruited among the undergraduate population of
Jena University with the help of Orsee (Greiner 2004),
e.g., to guarantee gender balanced sessions. The
experiment was fully computerized using z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007).
At the beginning of the experiment, each partici-
pant is randomly assigned to one of the two possible
roles (seller or buyer) and remains in this role
throughout the experiment: half of the participants
are buyers; the other half sellers. Without being made
aware of this, half of the sellers and buyers were male
and the other half females. In each round, participants
were randomly matched with a partner in the other role
in order to possibly trade the firm owned by the seller.
The value of the firm v, randomly selected for each
seller-buyer pair according to a discrete uniform
distribution concentrated on (0, 100), is told only to
the seller (the actual values in the experiment, selected
in steps of 5, were 5, 10, …, 95). Both (seller and
buyer) are aware of the proportion (q), correlating the
true evaluations v and qv linearly. This proportion q is
randomly selected from a discrete uniform distribution
(0, 1); the actual values q in the experiment were
rescaled in percentages and could only assume the
following values: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 or 90
percent.
In each round (see Table 1), bargaining proceeds in
the following way: the seller sends a value message (v^)
to the buyer which can be true or false but not exceed
100. After receiving the message, the buyer proposes a
price p which cannot exceed 100. Having received the
price offer, the seller can accept it or not. If accepted,
the firm is sold at the offered price; if not, no trade
takes place. After each round, payoffs are calculated
and privately communicated to buyer and seller.
3.1 Treatments
We ran four treatments differing in information only:
in treatment U (Unknown), trading partners, randomly
matched in pairs, are unaware of the others gender,
which becomes known in treatment G (awareness of
Gender constellation). Treatment OC (Other Con-
found) provides information about the field of study
instead (Economics versus Non-Economics). Finally,
treatment E (Embedded gender constellation) pro-
vides information about the other’s gender and field of
study. With the last treatment, we try to check possible
demand effects of informing about gender (constella-
tion) since, when embedded, one can feel obliged to
respond to gender as well as to field of study
(constellation), respectively to only one or none of
the two.
3.2 Matching
Random matching between buyers and sellers was
implemented to balance our sample by gender con-
stellation. Pairs occurred in equal proportion: male
buyer/female seller, male buyer/male seller, female
buyer/male seller and female buyer/female seller.
Participants were reminded in each round that they
have been randomly paired.
The matching was technically implemented by
recruiting as many male as female participants.
Furthermore, at the beginning of each session subjects
answered (via computer) a short questionnaire asking
for gender, field of study (economics vs non-eco-
nomics), age (above or below 25), level of education
(graduate vs undergraduate), smoking habits. Based
on this information, the computer assigned roles to
participants (seller vs buyer) as to generate pairs in
equal proportion.
11 The English translation of the Instructions of the whole
experiment is reported in Appendix 2.
12 For the results of the incentivized trial round, we refer to Di
Cagno et al. (2016).
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3.3 Payment
At the end of each round, participants were informed
about their final payoff for that round (in ECU). The
conversion rate from experimental points to euro
(1 euro = 30 ECU) was announced in the instructions.
If the seller accepted the offered price, the buyer
earned the difference between the value of the firm and
the price ðv pÞ and the seller the difference between
the accepted price and her evaluation of the firm
(p qv). If the price was not accepted, the final payoff
for both was zero. Participants received an initial
endowment of 300 ECU (10 euro) in order to avoid
bankruptcy. The actual payment was based on one
randomly selected round.
4 Descriptive statistics
We analyze here how experience affects (i) acceptance
of price offers, (ii) price offers p and suspicion v^ p,
(iii) value messages v^ and ‘‘make-up’’ v^ v by
comparing three successive phases consisting of 10
rounds each and labeled early phase (rounds 1–10),
intermediate phase (rounds 11–20) and late phase
(rounds 21–30).
4.1 Sellers’ acceptance
We consider three intervals for price offers, depending
on who gains, respectively, suffers a loss from
acceptance: p qv so that buyers gain and sellers
suffer a loss; qv\p\v when both, sellers and buyers,
gain; p v so that sellers gain and buyers lose (see
Fig. 1). Figure 2 illustrates the offers by phase and the
probability of acceptance for the three price intervals.
In particular, vertical bars refer to price offers and
horizontal lines refer to share of accepted offers within
the range as reported in Table 2; this means, for
instance, that 34.31 % of price offers are in p range 2
in Early phase and 89.3 % are accepted in this range in
Early phase. Table 2 reports also separately for each
phase the probability of acceptance by gender which
varies more with phase than with gender.
The share of nearly always accepted price offers
with p v is decreasing across phases from 31.06 to
22.71 %. The share of mostly refused price offers with
p qv increases across phases from 34.63 to 45 % (see
Fig. 2).
The gender effects are more subtle. In Table 2, we
compare gender with respect to responses averaged
over the ten rounds of each phase. We implement a
two-paired-sample test of proportions. This
table shows that for male sellers, the probability of
refusing an offer with p v is close to zero in every
phase, whereas for female sellers, it is slightly higher
in each phase and decreases across phases. For male
sellers, the probability of accepting an offer with
p qv is non-negligible and slightly decreasing across
phases from 4.66 to 3.53 %; for female sellers, this
probability is higher in the early phase and lower in the
late phase (see first row of Table 2).
Gender difference is never significant and tends to
disappear in the late phase, mainly due to female
sellers who seem to be more influenced by experience:
Table 1 Road map of game rounds
Stepa Seller Buyer Description
0 q, v known partner informationb q known partner informationb Initial information provided to buyers and sellers
1 Message v^ c Seller sends message to buyer
2 c Price offer pðv^Þ Buyer makes price offer
3 Acceptance dðpÞ c Seller accepts or refuses price offer
4 Payoff dðpÞðp qvÞ Payoff dðpÞðv pÞ Seller and buyer informed on payoff
a Each round involves four-steps
b Partner information depends on the treatment, see Sect. 3.1
c Participants wait for partner’s decision, i.e., they are inactive
Fig. 1 Intervals of price offers
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female sellers mostly decrease the acceptance rate
significantly through time, whereas for male sellers it
is constant (consistently, the test for difference in
means of Table 2 is significant only for female seller).
Furthermore, acceptance behavior is not influenced by
other regarding preferences: there is no or little
evidence of ‘‘altruistically minded’’ sellers rejecting
high price offers to protect buyers from losses or of
acceptance of welfare enhancing price offers in the
range p qv by which only the buyer can gain.
The share of price offers from which both sellers
and buyers gain are fairly constant across phases with
the probability of accepting them declining over time.
Time lapses to accept price offers decline across
rounds, revealing clear experience effects for both,
female and male sellers. Moreover, the time lapse is
shorter when it is obvious to accept (p v) than when
it is obvious to refuse (when p qv ). When both,
sellers and buyers, would gain the time lapse become
longer (see Appendix 1, Table 11).
Fig. 2 Price offers by
phase. Notes p range 1
p qv; p range 2 qv\p\v;
p range 3 p v. Vertical
bars refer to price offers and
horizontal lines refer to
share of accepted offers,
within each vertical bar as
reported in Table 2
Table 2 Probability of acceptance
Early phasea Intermediate phasea Late phasea Two sample test of proportionsb
F M Both F M Both F M Both F M Both
p qv 6.99 4.66 5.84 4.44 4.28 4.36 2.85 3.53 3.19
p value (0.24) (0.91) (0.57) (0.01) (0.44) (0.01)
df 649 755 844 748 745 1495
v[ p[ qv 88.72 89.91 89.3 89.84 90.48 90.17 82.15 86.13 84.18
p value (0.63) (0.79) (0.18) (0.02) (0.15) (0.01)
df 643 649 605 623 625 1250
p v 97.88 99 98.46 97.93 99.57 98.73 99.1 99.51 99.3
p value (0.21) (0.11) (0.96) (0.28) (0.53) (0.22)
df 488 392 354 503 504 1009
df degrees of freedom
a Test for difference in proportions by gender within stage. p values in brackets
b Test for difference in proportions between early and late phase for males, females and pooled observations. p values in brackets
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Result 1 Acceptance of price offers yielding a loss
for the seller is rare and decreases with experience.
Moreover, sellers do not protect buyers who would
lose by trading. Gender differences in acceptance
behavior are never significant although female sellers
mostly reduce their acceptance rate through time.
4.2 Price offers and suspicion
Price offers partly express how buyers want to share
the surplus from trade and partly reveal suspicion
regarding the value message received. For instance,
price offers when qv^\p\v^ could reveal trust in the
value message. Moreover, when v^ðvÞ ¼ v, offering
p ¼ ð1þqÞ
2
v^ would imply equal sharing offers higher
(lower) than
ð1þqÞ
2
v^ and would let sellers (buyers) gain
more (see Fig. 3). As is evident, price offers p qv^
clearly reveal suspicion: since truth-telling sellers
would reject them, buyers should propose them only
when expecting the message to overstate the value of
the firm.13
Figure 4 shows the distribution of price offers by
phase and range of q. There is substantial evidence that
buyers are suspicious and demand higher surplus
shares, which increases over time (represented by p
range 1 in Fig. 4). However, there are no relevant
gender differences (Table 3).
Furthermore, we use decision time to check for
differences in the cognitive process of female and
male participants. Although we do not appeal to the
usual interpretation of fast emotional and slower
deliberated choice making (see Kahneman 2013), it
still can be reasoned that a buyer participant con-
fronting repeatedly only or mostly very high and
thereby overstating value signals will be annoyed and
react more quickly by low price offers. Decision time
decreases for both female and male buyers and lapses
for price offers for p qv^, which are shorter than those
with p[ qv^. Decision lapses for offers in the range
qv^; v^ð Þ are longer. Interestingly, male buyers need
more time when demanding more for themselves, i.e.,
when offering p[ ð1þqÞv^
2
; whereas female buyers
need more time when demanding less for themselves
(see Appendix 1, Table 12).
Result 2 Buyers become more suspicious with
experience and more frequently offer prices lower
than qv^ which a truth-telling seller should find
unacceptable.
4.3 Value messages and ‘‘Make-Up’’
Sellers make up, i.e., choose v^[ v in most cases
(Fig. 8 in Appendix 1 shows the difference between v^
and v by phase), even though there is significant
evidence of truth-telling and surprisingly strong
evidence of understating. Table 4 shows that the share
of understating value messages monotonically
decreases across phases, whereas the shares of truth-
telling and overstating value messages increase.
Moreover, male sellers are generally more sincere
than females sellers: the share of true messages by
male sellers increases across phases, reaching in the
last phase nearly the 20 % of their messages, while the
share of true messages sent by female sellers remains
fairly stable (nearly 16 % in the last phase).
Decision time shows a strong experience effect: it
steadily decreases across phases. As expected, truth-
telling is faster than strategizing, with male sellers
thinking longer than female ones when overstating
(see Table 13 in Appendix 1).
If truth-telling is due to ethical obligations, one
should expect the same seller participants to mainly
choose v^ðvÞ ¼ v. Otherwise, truth-telling could be due
to the occasional investing in the informativeness of
value message v^.14 The transition matrix in Table 5
reports relative frequencies of seller participants who
are truth-telling i ¼ 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more times,
respectively, in one phase and truth-telling
j ¼ 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more times in the following
phase. Except for those, who never tell the truth, and
Fig. 3 Regions of price offers
13 Except for noise, we do not expect buyers to offer p v^.
14 In Fig. 5 we report the frequencies of truth-telling by phase
and by gender.
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those who do it at least five times, there is not much
consistency in sellers’ attitude across phases: seller
participants are either seriously restricted by ethical
concerns, or not at all, or just occasionally investing in
the informativeness of value messages v^.
Result 3 The majority of value messages overstate
and increases significantly across phases only for
female sellers ðp ¼ 0:01Þ. There is persistent evi-
dence of truth-telling which increases significantly
ðp ¼ 0:02Þ only for male sellers. Surprisingly, under-
stating is non-negligible but decreases across phases
significantly for both, male and female sellers.
4.4 Winner’s curse
Do buyer participants suffer from a ‘‘generalized’’
winner’s curse which in turn offers non-optimal
prices, thus earning less than predicted? Figure 6
Fig. 4 Price offers by
phase. Notes p range 1
p qv^; p range 2
ð1þqÞv^
2
[ p[ qv^; p range 3
ð1þqÞv^
2
 p\v^; p range 4
p[ v^
Table 3 Probability of price offers
Early phasea Intermediate phasea Late phasea Two sample test of proportionsb
F M Both F M Both F M Both F M Both
p qv^ 49.47 49.57 49.52 58.72 57.66 58.19 64.89 64.15 64.52
p value (0.96) (0.64) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
qv^\p\ ð1þqÞv^
2
36.81 38.51 37.66 36.06 35.74 35.9 30.74 31.81 31.28
p value (0.45) (0.89) (0.62) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
ð1þqÞv^
2
 p\v^ 9.68 7.66 8.67 3.94 4.47 4.2 3.09 2.77 2.93
p value (0.12) (0.57) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
p v^ 4.04 4.26 4.15 1.28 2.13 1.7 1.28 1.28 1.28
p value (0.82) (0.15) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
a Paired sample test for difference in proportions by gender within stage. p values in brackets. Degrees of freedom = 1878
b Paired sample test for difference in proportions between early and late phase for males, females and pooled observations. p values
in brackets. Degrees of freedom = 3758
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reports the difference between theoretically predicted
earnings and actual earnings, by level of q and by
experience. Figure 7 illustrates the difference between
the optimal price offer and the actual price offer, by
level of q and of experience.15 According to Fig. 6, for
q lower than 0.5 and higher than 0.6 optimal earnings
exceed the actual ones. Figure 7 provides an explana-
tion: in the interval 0:1\q\0:5 price offers which are
too low often exclude trade for which the accepted
optimal price p ¼ q would have implied a positive
expected profit for the buyer. On the contrary, for
q[ 0:5, positive price offers partly induce sellers to
accept them which, however, implies negative
expected profits for the buyer. Thus we confirm a
winner’s curse, which becomes less severe across
phases, especially for extreme values of q.
Also the difference between the optimal and the
actual price is monotonically decreasing with
experience (from the early to the late phase) for
all levels of q: it seems that with more experience,
buyers learn to avoid the winner’s curse. Moreover,
the effect on buyer profits is weaker since it depends
on seller acceptance. In Table 14 (Appendix 1), we
separate the results by gender: no gender difference
emerges from this table, i.e., male and female buyers
similarly suffer from the winner’s curse and learn to
avoid it.
5 Regression analysis
The following econometric analysis tries to addition-
ally confirm the (in)significant effects, reported above,
and to explore the determinants of acceptance, suspi-
cion and ‘‘make-up’’ in more detail. Exploiting the
longitudinal dimension of our dataset, we estimate
panel regressions with random effects to account for
the fact that participants play the Acquiring-a-Com-
pany game 30 times.16 For all the regression analysis,
we report standard errors clustered at individual level.
5.1 Acceptance behavior
Table 6 reports the results of different model speci-
fications for the pooled sample and for the gender sub-
samples. Acceptance in round t is a function of value
of the firm v, parameter q, price offer p, round and
acceptance decisions in the three previous rounds
(t  1, t  2 and t  3). Moreover, we alternatively
include the seller payoff in the previous round (t  1)
or the suspicion manifested by the buyer in the
Table 4 Value messages: truth-telling, overstating and understating
Early phasea Intermediate phasea Late phasea Two sample test of proportionsb
F M Both F M Both F M Both F M Both
Truth-telling (v^ ¼ v) 15.95 15.10 15.53 14.46 16.70 15.53 15.95 19.14 17.55
p value (0.61) (0.18) (0.07) (1.00) (0.02) (0.10)
Overstating (v^[ v) 66.81 72.77 69.79 72.87 72.02 72.45 72.55 71.60 72.07
p value (0.00) (0.68) (0.64) (0.01) (0.57) (0.12)
Understating (v^\v) 17.23 12.13 14.68 12.66 11.28 11.97 11.49 9.26 10.37
p value (0.00) (0.36) (0.11) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
a Test for difference in proportions by gender within stage. p values in brackets. Degrees of freedom = 1878
b Test for difference in proportions between early and late phase for males, females and pooled observations. p values in brackets.
Degrees of freedom = 3758
15 Recall that the optimal price offer is p ¼ q for q 0:5 and
p ¼ 0 for q[ 0:5, while expected earnings are 0:5  q for
q 0:5 and zero for q[ 0:5.
16 We use the STATA command xtreg for suspicion and
‘‘make-up’’ and xtprobit for acceptance. As a robustness check,
we also estimate a dynamic panel data model with xtabond2
which allows to fit the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998) estimators. The results obtained are qualita-
tively similar, even though xtreg and xtprobit are preferred with
dataset characterized by large T (in our case, 30 rounds) and
large N. The estimates of the dynamic panel data model are
available upon request.
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previous round (t  1), i.e., the difference between the
value message and the price offer in t  1.17
Columns 1 to 6 report the results for the pooled
(column 1 and 2) as well as the sample separated by
gender (columns 3 and 4 for female, 5 and 6 for male
sellers). As expected, the value of the firm v and the
parameter q are negatively and significantly associated
with the probability of acceptance, with a larger price
offer enhancing acceptance.18 Interestingly, the prob-
ability of acceptance does not vary across rounds, i.e.,
the coefficients of the variable round are not statisti-
cally significant (with the only exception of column 1).
Looking at the results by gender the association
between previous acceptance and current acceptance
holds only for t  1 with an opposite sign for female
Fig. 5 Frequencies of truth-telling by phase and by gender
17 The regression analysis in Table 6 focuses on the relation
between acceptance and past experience, controlling for q,v and
p. Therefore, the analysis of path dependence is the main point
of the table. Nonetheless, we were aware that price proposals
may depend on seller’s value message. To address this potential
endogeneity, we estimated a reduced form of our model with
three equations representing separately the subjects’ choice
sequence: first, the value message by the seller, then the price
proposal by the buyer and finally the acceptance decision by the
seller. This approach leads to the same qualitative results as
those discussed in Table 6, and therefore it confirms that the
endogeneity issue does not affect the absence of path depen-
dence. Table 15 reported in Appendix 1 shows the estimates of
the reduced form model.
18 One of our anonymous reviewers pointed to the fact that
sellers via their value signals, v^, may have influenced the price
offer and beware of such influence what might have affected
their acceptance. When including additionally v^ as an explana-
tory variable in Table 6, the effect of v^ is significant. In our view,
the effect of v^ on p is quite ambiguous: a seller with large v
signaling a large v^ might be annoyed by a low price offer,
whereas one with low v but an overstating large v^ should not be
at all surprised.
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and male sellers whose significance, however, is
questioned when including previous payoff, respec-
tively previous suspicion. In particular, when we
include the previous payoff, acceptance in t  1
positively affects acceptance in round t by female
sellers. On the contrary, when we include suspicion in
t  1, acceptance in t  1 negatively affects accep-
tance in time t by male sellers. It seems that male
sellers are more sensitive to previous gains than
females when deciding to accept or not.
In order to explore any potential gender constel-
lation effect, we ran the same specifications, this
Table 5 Transition matrix of truth-telling
Times of truth-telling in phase E (in rows)a Times of truth-telling in phase I (in columns)
0 1 2 3 4 5?
0 (65) 0.508b 0.277 0.154 0.062 0.000 0.000
1 (59) 0.322 0.271 0.339 0.034 0.017 0.017
2 (27) 0.296 0.259 0.259 0.111 0.037 0.037
3 (17) 0.235 0.353 0.235 0.059 0.000 0.118
4 (7) 0.000 0.429 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.286
5? (13) 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.154 0.154 0.538
Times of truth-telling in phase I (in rows)a Times of truth-telling in phase L (in columns)
0 1 2 3 4 5?
0 (66) 0.500c 0.303 0.121 0.061 0.000 0.015
1 (50) 0.320 0.400 0.140 0.080 0.040 0.020
2 (43) 0.326 0.163 0.326 0.093 0.047 0.047
3 (12) 0.083 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.083 0.333
4 (4) 0.000 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.500
5? (13) 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.769
a In brackets number of sellers telling the truth (0, 1, …, 5?) times
b For instance, 50.8 % of the 65 seller participants who never told the truth in the early phase also never told the truth in the
intermediate phase
c For instance, 50 % of the 66 seller participants who never told the truth in the intermediate phase also never told the truth in the late
phase
Fig. 6 Winner’s curse—
difference between
predicted earnings and
actual earnings
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time only with data retrieved from the treatments
Embedded gender constellation and Gender, sepa-
rately for female and male: the coefficient of the
partner’s gender is positive but not statistically
significant, i.e., we do not confirm a gender
constellation effect.
5.2 Suspicion
Table 7 collects results on the dynamics of suspicion.
Models 1 to 6 include data from all treatments
controlling for parameter q, value message, round
and the level of suspicion of the three lagged periods.
Furthermore, we alternatively control for lagged
earnings and lagged ‘‘make-up.’’ As expected, suspi-
cion depends positively (and significantly) on v^ and
negatively (and significantly) on q. The coefficient of
round is positive and significant, i.e., suspicion
increases through time. The coefficient of lagged
earning is negative and significant, i.e., a larger payoff
in the previous round induces buyers to be less
suspicious. Furthermore, larger ‘‘make-up’’ of sellers
in the previous round significantly increases buyer
suspicion.
In columns 7 to 10, we check for gender constel-
lation effects by considering the Embedded gender
constellations treatment and the Gender treatment.
Data for female (male) buyers are reported in
columns 7 and 8 (9 and 10). When controlling for
partner’s gender, we find that the effect of lagged
earning and lagged ‘‘make-up’’ has the same sign,
but is not significant anymore. On the other hand,
female buyers interacting with male sellers tend to be
more suspicious. To check whether this latter result
is due to a specific gender constellation effect, we run
a similar specification controlling for the partner’s
field of study (economics vs non-economics), with
data from the Other Confound treatment (see
Table 8) displaying the partner’s field of study as
statistically not significant.19 This altogether con-
firms an interesting gender constellation effect:
(female) participants find the information about the
partner’s gender relevant, and this effect is persistent
across rounds.
As an additional check, we estimated the initial
specification using data only from the Other Confound
treatment and Unknown treatment (with no informa-
tion about the trading partner), and found lagged
earnings and lagged ‘‘make-up’’ to be even more
influential and significant (see Table 9). Thus condi-
tioning on gender (constellation) seems to interact
with path dependence: male buyers are more influ-
enced by own idiosyncratic past experiences than
reacting to their partner’s or own gender, whereas
female buyers persistently are more suspicious when
encountering male sellers.
Fig. 7 Winner’s curse—
difference between optimal
price offer and actual price
offer
19 ‘‘Field of study’’ and ‘‘Field of Study constellation’’ as
implemented experimentally does not significantly affects
making-up and acceptance.
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5.3 Make-up
Table 10 collects results on the dynamics of ‘‘make-
up.’’ Models 1 to 6 include data from all treatments
controlling for parameter q, value of the firm, round
and lagged level of ‘‘make-up’’ with up to three
periods. Furthermore, we alternatively control for
lagged earnings and lagged suspicion. As expected,
the coefficients of q and v are, respectively, positive
and negative, and highly significant. The round is
never statistically significant, i.e., ‘‘make-up’’ does not
follow a clear path across rounds. However, there is
persistence in cheating: the influence of lagged
‘‘make-up’’ is positive and significant. Lagged suspi-
cion is always positive and significant: sellers increase
‘‘make-up’’ after having met a suspicious buyer.
Interestingly, the coefficient of the payoff in the
previous round is positive and significant for male
sellers but negative for female sellers. To explore any
potential gender constellation effect for acceptance
and suspicion, we run the same specifications only
with data from the treatments Embedded gender
constellations and Gender, separately for female and
male sellers without diagnosing any significant effect,
i.e., the coefficient of the partner’s gender is not
statistically significant.20
6 Conclusions
This study is a rather systematic attempt to account for
possible effects of gender (constellation) in an easily
understood (by participants) but nonetheless complex
Table 8 Suspicion
Robust standard errors,
clustered at individual level,
are presented in parenthesis
Statistical significance: *
0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01
(11) (12) (13) (14)
Treatment OC
F F M M
b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE)
q -0.18***
(0.05)
-0.18***
(0.05)
-0.18***
(0.06)
-0.18***
(0.05)
v^ 0.67***
(0.04)
0.67***
(0.04)
0.73***
(0.04)
0.73***
(0.04)
Round 0.14
(0.11)
0.15
(0.11)
0.11
(0.08)
0.11
(0.09)
Suspicion (Lag1) 0.14***
(0.04)
0.12**
(0.05)
0.13**
(0.05)
0.09*
(0.05)
Suspicion (Lag2) 0.12***
(0.03)
0.13***
(0.03)
0.07**
(0.04)
0.08**
(0.04)
Suspicion (Lag3) 0.10**
(0.04)
0.10**
(0.04)
0.14***
(0.05)
0.13***
(0.05)
Earning (Lag1) -0.06*
(0.04)
-0.13**
(0.05)
Make-up (Lag1) 0.03
(0.03)
0.07**
(0.04)
Partner study: economics = 1 2.92
(2.00)
3.10
(2.08)
0.65
(1.80)
0.75
(1.68)
Constant -14.16***
(5.33)
-14.46***
(5.30)
-15.63**
(6.44)
-15.90**
(6.50)
Observations 432 432 432 432
Subjects 16 16 16 16
Rounds 27 27 27 27
20 Using data from the Treatment Other Confound, we also
investigate potential effects of including the partner’s field of
study. We find that this variable does not have any effect with all
our results being confirmed.
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environment allowing for asymmetric information,
truth-telling and deception, other regarding concerns
in bargaining and conditioning on gender (constella-
tion) as well as on another confound (field of study).
Our experimental workhorse is the modified Acquir-
ing-a-Company game (Samuelson and Bazerman
1985), which allows the better informed seller to send
a value message before the buyer’s price offer. The
main motivation here has been to explore how both,
experience and gender (constellation), influence
behavior of buyers and sellers. Rather than speculating
about gender differences in individual learning, for
which there exists no obvious hypotheses, we wanted
to see which gender (constellation) and other behav-
ioral effects survive extensive game playing experi-
ence and whether conditioning on gender constellation
can evolve anew. We did not experimentally induce
initial female handicap, e.g., by a lower parameter q of
female than of male sellers. Such an initial handicap
strongly has been prevailing in the field due to
traditional labor division in most human societies.
Our findings demonstrate how conditioning on
gender (constellation) is affected by game playing
experience and past outcome and behavior. Further-
more, the main experience and gender (constellation)
effects apply to suspicion, i.e., the pricing behavior in
light of the received values messages. Interestingly,
sellers adapt more to past experiences, differing from
buyers, who condition more on gender constellation.
Compared to our companion paper based on
playing a single incentivized round of the Modified
Acquiring-a-Company game, in recursive play by
(random) strangers gender differences emerge across
phases. Male and female participants learn to react
differently both to past behavior and to the gender of
their trading partner.
Additionally, there are other surprising results: the
significantly positive share of underreporting and the
persistence of truth-telling messages whose reasons
are ‘‘obsessive truth-telling’’ or ‘‘investing in the
informativeness of value messages.’’ And, more
fundamentally, there is hardly any evidence of other
regarding concerns suggesting that these are rather
context dependent and likely to be crowed out in
stochastic environments, especially those involving
asymmetric information.
Our experimental workhorse allows for chance
effects (the random value v), asymmetric information
about v, bargaining whether to trade and, if so, how to
share the gains from welfare enhancing trade, with
buyer participants at risk of suffering from a winner’s
curse, and—due to our modification—also from
deception (see Gneezy et al. 2013, for some experi-
mental studies). According to us, such a stylized
complex decision environment can sooner or later
crowd out or at least discourage attempts to condition
decision making on gender (constellation), which may
not prove when the cognitive load is less demanding.
In any future research, this could be tested by
exploring experience and gender effects for simpler
versions of our setup, e.g., by forcing seller partici-
pants to accept whatever price proposal, or by making
deception costly.
From a theoretical perspective, it is shown—as
predicted—that even extensive game playing
Table 9 Suspicion
(15) (16)
Treatment U & OC
All All
b/(SE) b/(SE)
q -0.18***
(0.03)
-0.18***
(0.03)
v^ 0.71***
(0.02)
0.71***
(0.02)
Round 0.14***
(0.05)
0.14***
(0.05)
Suspicion (Lag1) 0.16***
(0.02)
0.13***
(0.02)
Suspicion (Lag2) 0.12***
(0.02)
0.12***
(0.02)
Suspicion (Lag3) 0.11***
(0.02)
0.12***
(0.02)
Earning (Lag1) -0.10***
(0.02)
Make-up (Lag1) 0.04**
(0.02)
Constant -16.43***
(2.69)
-16.56***
(2.69)
Observations 1620 1620
Subjects 60 60
Rounds 27 27
Robust standard errors, clustered at individual level, are
presented in parenthesis
Statistical significance: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01
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experience does not imply convergence to equilibrium
play, e.g., to price offers p ¼ q for q 0:5 and p ¼ 0
for q[ 0:5. Nevertheless, behavior is improved by
experience: the winner’s curse is more frequently
avoided, with seller participants more frequently
rejecting unprofitable price offers which, of course,
excludes trade (although it is welfare enhancing).
From a theoretical perspective, it also might be
interesting on how the recursive play of the Modified
Acquiring-a-Company game would evolve if partici-
pants are constantly paired up with the same partic-
ipant in the other role. Would seller participants
initially signal the truth and switch to ‘‘making-up’’
only when approaching the last round? Would buyer
participants initially believe in the truth of v^ and
suggest prices which share ð1  qÞv^ equally? These
are interesting research questions indeed. However, in
our view, such a scenario does not seem very realistic:
when successively bargaining over takeovers this will
hardly ever be done by the same parties.
Appendix 1: Tables
See Tables 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 and Fig. 8.
Table 11 Time (s) for acceptance by p, q, experience and gender
Early stage Intermediate stage Late stage All rounds T tests: early–late
F M Both F M Both F M Both F M Both F M Both
p qv 6.40 6.20 6.30 3.60 3.41 3.50 2.63 3.13 2.88 4.08 4.14 4.11 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.63) (0.47) (0.07) (0.74)
v[ p[ qv 7.34 6.85 7.10 5.00 4.66 4.83 3.75 3.47 3.60 5.44 5.01 5.22 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.27) (0.38) (0.44) (0.08)
p v 6.68 5.82 6.23 3.94 4.18 4.05 3.19 2.54 2.87 4.76 4.40 4.58 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.16) (0.54) (0.09) (0.23)
By level of q : q 50
p qv 6.14 6.20 6.16 3.88 3.18 3.53 2.56 3.18 2.86 4.09 4.06 4.07 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.92) (0.14) (0.15) (0.94)
v[ p[ qv 7.45 7.02 7.24 4.74 4.62 4.68 3.86 3.53 3.69 5.40 5.08 5.24 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.39) (0.76) (0.41) (0.24)
p v 7.19 5.41 6.27 3.10 3.96 3.53 2.39 2.14 2.26 4.57 4.07 4.32 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.09) (0.11) (0.53) (0.32)
By level of q : q[ 50
p qv 6.60 6.20 6.40 3.43 3.54 3.49 2.68 3.09 2.88 4.07 4.19 4.13 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.48) (0.72) (0.24) (0.63)
v[ p[ qv 6.86 5.92 6.44 6.20 4.89 5.54 3.09 3.21 3.16 5.63 4.64 5.13 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.35) (0.26) (0.86) (0.09)
p v 6.20 6.21 6.21 4.52 4.36 4.44 3.81 2.89 3.38 4.92 4.69 4.81 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.99) (0.77) (0.12) (0.54)
p values in parenthesis: we run tests both for static gender differences (above each observation) and dynamic differences across
periods for male, female and pooled sample (last three columns on the right)
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Table 13 Time for message by truth-telling, overstating and understating
Early stage Intermediate stage Late stage All rounds T tests: early–late
F M Both F M Both F M Both F M Both F M Both
v ¼ v^ 10.47 10.98 10.72 6.94 7.19 7.08 5.33 5.67 5.52 7.60 7.74 7.68 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.46) (0.57) (0.25) (0.65)
Overstating value
of v
11.18 11.60 11.40 7.75 7.93 7.84 6.19 6.30 6.24 8.30 8.62 8.46 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.17) (0.45) (0.60) (0.04)
Understating
value of v
13.31 12.67 13.05 8.38 8.68 8.52 6.38 6.63 6.49 9.88 9.58 9.75 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.43) (0.63) (0.63) (0.51)
By level of q: q B 0.5
v ¼ v^ 9.70 10.86 10.27 6.58 7.10 6.86 5.27 5.88 5.59 7.19 7.81 7.51 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.17) (0.37) (0.13) (0.12)
Overstating
value of v
11.21 11.56 11.39 7.45 7.79 7.62 6.07 6.38 6.22 8.19 8.63 8.41 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.41) (0.30) (0.26) (0.05)
Understating
value of v
13.16 12.80 13.02 8.89 8.26 8.60 5.95 6.55 6.23 9.86 9.31 9.62 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.73) (0.40) (0.25) (0.34)
By level of q: q[ 0.5
v ¼ v^ 11.52 11.16 11.35 7.40 7.30 7.35 5.43 5.41 5.42 8.17 7.66 7.90 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.76) (0.88) (0.95) (0.32)
Overstating
value of v
11.14 11.64 11.40 8.05 8.10 8.07 6.33 6.20 6.26 8.41 8.62 8.51 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.24) (0.90) (0.67) (0.36)
Understating
value of v
13.65 12.43 13.11 7.09 9.66 8.33 7.29 6.86 7.12 9.93 10.18 10.04 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.31) (0.02) (0.74) (0.75)
p values in parenthesis: we run tests both for static gender differences (above each observation) and dynamic differences across
periods for male, female and pooled sample (last three columns on the right)
Table 14 Winner’s curse, measured by differences in earnings and prices
q levels 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 %
Difference between optimal earning and actual earning
All rounds 22.06 15.10 10.25 5.10 -2.11 0.26 3.60 4.91 6.23
Early stage 24.97 16.35 11.11 4.60 -1.39 0.26 3.34 7.05 6.65
Intermediate stage 21.44 13.19 9.68 3.52 -3.11 -0.35 3.84 4.06 7.14
Late stage 19.77 15.91 9.90 7.00 -1.98 0.90 3.63 3.79 4.89
t test E versus L (p value) (0.05) (0.86) (0.52) (0.21) (0.70) (0.64) (0.81) (0.01) (0.17)
Difference between optimal price and actual price
All rounds -7.64 -0.63 6.05 13.83 21.60 -31.33 -31.49 -34.42 -36.28
Early stage -10.63 -2.77 4.59 9.68 18.27 -33.16 -33.99 -38.10 -39.94
Intermediate stage -7.64 -0.62 6.19 14.37 20.78 -31.89 -31.21 -35.01 -36.80
Late stage -4.71 1.90 7.41 16.77 26.09 -28.92 -29.23 -30.31 -32.31
t test E versus L (p value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
p values in parenthesis: we run tests for dynamic differences across periods
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Appendix 2: Instructions
Introduction
Welcome to our experiment!
During this experiment, you will be asked to make
several decisions and so will the other participants.
Please read the instructions carefully. Your deci-
sions, as well as the decisions of the other participants,
will determine your earnings according to some rules,
which will be shortly explained later. In addition to
your earnings from your decisions over the course of
the experiment, you will receive a participation fee of
10 euro. Besides this amount, you can earn more euro.
However, there is also a possibility of losing part of the
participation fee, as it will be explained in the next
section of these instructions. But do not worry: you
will never be asked to pay with your own money, as
your losses during the tasks will be covered by the
participation fee. The participation fee and any
additional amount of money you will earn during the
experiment will be paid individually immediately at
the end of the experiment; no other participant will
know how much you earned. All monetary amounts in
the experiment will be computed in ECU (Experi-
mental Currency Units). At the end of the experiment,
all earned in ECUs will be converted into euro using
the following exchange rate:
30 ECU ¼ 1 euro
You will be making your decisions by clicking on
appropriate buttons on the screen. All the participants
are reading the same instructions and taking part in this
experiment for the first time, as you are.
Please note that hereafter any form of communica-
tion between the participants is strictly prohibited. If
you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the
experiment with no payment. If you have any ques-
tions, please raise your hand. The experimenter will
come to you and answer your questions individually.
Description of the experiment
This experiment is fully computerized. This experi-
ment consists of the following four phases, each
composed by a different number of rounds: Phase I
of 1 round, Phase II of 30 rounds, Phase III of 12
rounds, and Phase IV of 10 rounds. After completing
Phase I, you will proceed to Phase II; after completing
Phase II, you will proceed to Phase III; after complet-
ing Phase III you will proceed to Phase IV. You can
earn money in each phase of the experiment.
At the beginning and at the end of the Experiment,
you are asked to reply to a short questionnaire.
At the beginning of the Experiment, each partici-
pant is randomly assigned one of two possible roles.
Half the participants will be assigned the role of
Buyer; the other half will be assigned the role of
Seller. You will remain in the same role you have been
assigned throughout the experiment.
In each of Phase I, II and III and in each of their
rounds you will be matched with a different participant
randomly assigned to you. In Phase IV you will decide
individually and independently of your role.
Description of the task: Phase I
In Phase I selling of a firm between a Seller, who owns
the firm, and Buyer can take place. You will be told if
you are Buyer or Seller, and will be matched with one
of the other participant in the other role. For example,
if you are selected as Buyer, then you will be randomly
and anonymously matched with another participant
who is a Seller.
The computer will randomly select the value of the
firm among the following values: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30,
35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90 and 95 (all
the values are equally likely). This value will be
communicated only to the Seller. The Buyer will not
learn the value of the firm selected randomly by the
computer.
The Seller’s evaluation of the firm is proportional to
the value of the firm selected by the computer. This
Fig. 8 Value message and the true value by phase
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proportion will be randomly selected by the computer
and can only take one of the following values: 10, 20,
30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 or 90 percent (all the values are
equally likely). The Seller’s evaluation is the value of
the firm multiplied by the selected proportion. The
proportion will be communicated to both, Buyer and
Seller, whereas the value of the firm will be known
only to the Seller. Do not worry: the software will
provide the information on the decision screen,
depending on your role, Seller or Buyer.
As an example, suppose that the computer selected
a value of the firm equal to 90 and a proportion of 50
percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm will
be 45, corresponding to 50 percent of 90. In this case,
the Seller will find on the screen of the computer that
the value of the firm is 90, the proportion is 50 percent
and that the Seller’s evaluation is 45; the Buyer will
find on the screen only the proportion of 50 percent.
Another example: suppose that the computer selected
a value of the firm equal to 90 and a proportion of 80
percent. In this case, the Seller’s evaluation will be
equal to 72, corresponding to 80 percent of 90. In this
case, the Seller will find on the screen of the computer
that the value of the firm is 90, the proportion is 80
percent and that the Seller’s evaluation is 72; the
Buyer will find on the screen only the proportion of 80
percent.
The Seller sends a value message to the Buyer
about the value of the firm, which can be either true or
false. Therefore, the value message is not necessarily
equal to the firm value nor to the Seller’s evaluation of
the firm. The message consists of an integer value
between 0 and 100.
After having received the message, the Buyer
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the Seller by
proposing a price, an integer number between 0 and
100. When making this offer, the Buyer just knows the
value message and by which proportion of the value
the Seller evaluates the firm.
After having received the price offer of the
Buyer, the Seller decides whether to accept it or not.
If she accepts, the firm will be sold for the offered
price to the Buyer. If she does not accept, no trade
takes place. After the Seller has decided, the payoffs
of Buyer and of Seller are calculated and individ-
ually communicated at the end of Phase I. These
payoffs are calculated as explained below, and they
are paid to all participants at the end of the
experiment.
Calculation of the payoff in Phase I
The payoff of the unique round in Phase I does not
depend on the value message and is calculated as
follows:
If the Seller has accepted the offered price, the
payoffs are:
• The Buyer earns the difference between the value
of the firm and the accepted price
• The Seller earns the difference between the
accepted price and the Seller’s evaluation of the
firm
An example: suppose that the firm value is equal to 45
and that the proportion of the firm value is 80 percent,
so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is 36.
Suppose the Buyer offers a price equal to 40 and that
the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns
45  40 ¼ 5, and the Seller earns 40  36 ¼ 4.
Another example: suppose that the firm value is
equal to 45 and that the proportion of the firm value is
80 percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is
36. Suppose the Buyer offers a price equal to 55 and
that the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns
45  55 ¼ 10, and the Seller earns 55  36 ¼ 19.
If the Seller does not accept the Buyer’s offer, the
payoffs are 0 for both Seller and Buyer.
Description of the task: Phase II
In Phase II, you will face for 30 rounds the same
situation as in Phase I. As in the previous Phase, in
each of the rounds you will be matched with a different
participant randomly assigned to you.
The same instructions as in Phase I apply to Phase
II, also the calculation of the payoffs.
The payment from this Phase will consist of the
payoff of one of the 30 rounds randomly selected.
For example, if round number five is selected, your
payment for Phase II will be the payoff you earned in
that round.
Calculation of the payoff in each round in Phase II
The payoff of each round in Phase II does not
depend on the value message and is calculated as
follows:
If the Seller has accepted the offered price, the
payoffs are:
• The Buyer earns the difference between the value
of the firm and the accepted price
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• The Seller earns the difference between the
accepted price and the Seller’s evaluation of the
firm
An example: suppose that the firm value is equal to 45
and that the proportion of the firm value is 80 percent,
so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is 36.
Suppose the Buyer offer a price equal to 40, and that
the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns
45  40 ¼ 5, and the Seller earns 40  36 ¼ 4.
Another example: suppose that the firm value is
equal to 45 and that the proportion of the firm value is
80 percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is
36. Suppose the Buyer offers a price equal to 55, and
that the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns
45  55 ¼ 10, and the Seller earns 55  36 ¼ 19.
If the Seller does not accept the Buyer’s offer, the
payoffs are 0 for both Seller and Buyer.
Description of the task: Phase III
In Phase III, you will face for 12 rounds the same
situation as in Phase I. As in the previous Phase, in
each of the rounds you will be matched with a different
participant randomly assigned to you.
The same instructions as in Phase I apply to Phase
III.
At the beginning of the Phase, you will be asked if
you prefer to be paid on the basis of the payoff of one
of the 12 rounds randomly selected or on the basis of
the average payoff of the 12 rounds. On the basis of
your choice, the computer will calculate your payoff
for this Phase.
Calculation of the payoff in each round in Phase III
The payoff of each round in Phase II does not
depend on the value message and is calculated as
follows:
If the Seller has accepted the offered price, the
payoffs are:
• The Buyer earns the difference between the value
of the firm and the accepted price
• The Seller earns the difference between the
accepted price and the Seller’s evaluation of the
firm
An example: suppose that the firm value is equal to 45
and that the proportion of the firm value is 80 percent,
so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is 36.
Suppose the Buyer offers a price equal to 40 and that
the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns
45  40 ¼ 5, and the Seller earns 40  36 ¼ 4.
Another example: suppose that the firm value is
equal to 45 and that the proportion of the firm value is
80 percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is
36. Suppose the Buyer offers a price equal to 55, and
that the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns
45  55 ¼ 10, and the Seller earns 55  36 ¼ 19.
If the Seller does not accept the Buyer’s offer, the
payoffs are 0 for both Seller and Buyer.
Description of the task: Phase IV
Phase IV consists of 10 rounds; during this Phase, you
will not interact with other participants. During this
phase, you are asked to choose between pairs of
lotteries. In particular, in each round for each lottery
pair you have to assess which one you would prefer to
play.
At the end of the experiment, one round will be
randomly selected for payment, and the computer will
play on your screen the lottery that you have preferred
in this round. The payment of Phase IV is given by the
result of this lottery.
Your final payment
Your final payment will be displayed on the screen at
the end of the experiment. It is determined as the sum
of:
• Payoff from the unique round in Phase I (in euro)
• Payoff from one randomly selected round in Phase
II (in euro)
• Payoff from EITHER one randomly selected round
OR an average payment between 12 rounds from
Phase III (in euro)
• Payoff from one randomly selected round in Phase
IV (in euro)
• Participation fee.
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